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On July 30, 1979, the Council on Environmental Quality finalized
a set of regulations intended to guide federal agencies in the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements required by the National
Environmental Policy Act. In this article, the author discusses how these
regulations will affect the preparation of broad coverage Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statements. The article examines how the regulations are integrated with existing case law in the area and focuses on
the standards for the proper scope and timing of required impact
statements.

THE PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT AND THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT REGULATIONS
Patrick E. Barney*
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) recently
issued a set of regulations intended to guide federal agencies

in the preparation of environmental impact statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act. The new

regulations are an attempt to clarify problems which arose
in the course of statement preparation under the previously

existing CEQ statement guidelines. One recurring concern
under the old guidelines was the proper treatment of broad
agency actions. This paper reviews the leading court cases

illustrating the concerns involved in such situations and
then examines portions of the new regulations dealing with

these concerns.
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming
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Since the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)'
became law in 1970, courts and federal agencies have
struggled with the question of what constitutes an adequate
environmental impact statement (EIS) .2Proper application
of the EIS requirement is essential to the implementation
of NEPA's stated policy of having the ". .. Federal Government . ..use all practicable means and measures .. .to
foster and promote the general welfare, [and] to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony. .

."I The importance of the EIS

requirement derives from the fact that it is the primary
"action-forcing" provision of NEPA.4 The procedural requirements of Section 102(2) (C) (which contains the EIS
requirements) were conceived as a way of ensuring that the
policies expressed in the Act were actually implemented by
federal agencies.' Litigants seeking to enforce agency compliance with NEPA have concentrated on challenges to the
adequacy of agency EISs.6 This dependence upon the adequacy of the EIS as the basis for challenging federal agency
action results from the lack of any other procedural or substantive NEPA requirements which are sufficiently clear to
challenge through litigation.7
Early NEPA challenges focused on the adequacy of
narrow agency EISs prepared for individual projects con1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et. seq. (1976).
2. Section 102(2) (C) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)
(1976) requires
"in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) [Tihe environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) [A]ny adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) [Ailternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) [T]he relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) [A]ny irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented."
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976).
4. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 91-296]; Note, Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact Statement: The Interrelationship of Impacts, 1976 DUKE L.J. 623, 624 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as DUKE Note].
5. See: S. REP. No. 91-296, 12-20.
6. See: Koshland, The Scope of the Program EIS Requirement: The Need for
a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 STAN. L. REV. 767, 774 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Koshland].
7. Wegner, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 124, 132 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wegner].

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1

2

Barney: The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the National
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

1981

sidering only localized effects.8 However, as NEPA challenges
became more refined, the concept of a programmatic, comprehensive, or generic EIS developed.' One of the earliest
cases to make a thoughtful consideration of the applicability
of the programmatic concept was Scientists' Institute for
Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission.'"
SIPI v. AEC involved a highly technical nuclear energy
research program which consisted of many individual projects.11 After examining the purpose behind NEPA, the
court held "that NEPA requires impact statements for
major federal research programs ...

aimed at development

of new technologies which, when applied, will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment".' Speaking in
broader terms, the court found that the AEC had taken an
"unnecessarily crabbed approach to NEPA in assuming that
the impact statement process was designed only for particular facilities rather than for analysis of the overall effects
of broad agency programs ....

[and that] quite the contrary

is true."" The court held that justification for requiring
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements (PEISs)
exists in the statutory language of NEPA.
Few later cases attained as great an understanding of
the concepts which suggest the need for a broad EIS as was
expressed by the SIPI v. AEC court. Nevertheless, other
courts have gareed that at times NEPA requires an EIS
covering more than just one limited project. For example,
in Cady v. Morton 4 the court found that NEPA had not
been satisfied in a situation in which individual EISs
evaluating individual coal mines had been prepared, but a
broader comprehensive statement, reviewing the leasing of
a huge tract of federal coal land which encompassed the
individual mine sites, had been omitted; and in the case
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, which may be considered the "last
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Note, Program Environmental Impact Statements: Review and Remedies,
75 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MICH. Note]; Koshland,
775.
Hereinafter referred to as a programmatic EIS or PEIS.
Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SIPI v. AEC].
See text accompanying n. 21 for more detailed discussion of SIPI v. AEC.
SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1091.
Id. at 1086-87.

14. Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975).
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word" on the programmatic statement requirements of
NEPA, 1 the Supreme Court recognized "that [Section]
102(2) (C) may require a comprehensive impact statement
in certain situations where several proposed actions are
pending at the same time."1
The courts have made it clear that in certain situations
NEPA does in fact require the evaluation of an entire
government program in an EIS. However, the question which
remains is, to which government actions should this broader
scope evaluation be applied to fulfill the congressional goal
of incorporating environmental concerns into agency decision
making.17
This potential applicability of NEPA, specifically the
EIS requirement, to broad government policy matters has
not made the more limited project statement obsolete. The
preparation of a site specific EIS remains, in many cases,
essential for proper environmental planning. The PEIS
simply expresses the need to evaluate some activities from
a broader perspective. Overall program decision, which
might involve numerous localized actions, may escape environmental review unless a broad scope statement is required. However, often it is not possible to distinguish what
is properly called a "program" from what is a "project" for
purposes of statement preparation. There are no hard rules
governing what each type of statement properly includes.
It is certainly possible that concerns considered in one type
of statement could be evaluated as well in the other. 8 This
inherent flexibility between the definitions of program and
project actions has lead to difficulty in determining the
proper scope of a required EIS. This softness in the distinction between programs and projects is in part to blame for
the difficulty which courts have encountered in developing
a set of standards by which to judge the adequacy of a PEIS.19
15. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). [hereinafter cited in text as
Kleppe].
16. Id. at 409.
17. S. REP. No. 91-296.
18. SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1092.
19. See discussion of confusion in concepts at text accompanying n. 86.
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The programmatic EIS issue usually occurs when the
responsible federal agency has prepared an EIS for a site
specific project but the agency's failure to evaluate the
entire program, of which the project is but a part, in a
broad coverage statement is challenged. In such a challenge,
the court must decide whether NEPA requires the preparation of the additional broader statement. The court is faced
with the choice of either finding the project EIS inadequate
due to the lack of a program statement, and perhaps enjoining action on the project until the program statement is
completed, or separating examination of the two statements
and allowing the project to continue as long as its site
specific EIS is adequate..2 ' A decision either way produces a
chorus of protest from one or the other of the interests
involved in the matter.
A thoughtful examination of many of the concerns of a
typical programmatic EIS challenge is found in SIPI v.
AEC.2 1 At issue was whether NEPA required the AEC to
prepare a broad EIS for its Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor (LMFBR) development program and, if such a
statement was required, when should it be prepared. The
AEC already had issued adequate project EISs for each of
the facilities it had constructed and took the position that
"no separate NEPA analysis of an entire research and
development program [was] required".22
The court was faced squarely with the issue of whether
NEPA had been intended to apply to broad programs or was
limited to individual actions. After examining NEPA's
legislative history and the case law applying NEPA's impact
statement procedure to a wide variety of federal agency
activities, the court concluded that the Act had been intended
to have far-reaching application." The court held that an
20.

See discussion of Sierra Club v. Kleppe, at text accompanying n. 83, and
also approach of new regulations at n. 118.
21. SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10.
22. Id. at 1085. The court was not faced with the question of whether to halt
work on specific sites if a program statement was found necessary. Plaintiffs had not requested such relief and the only relief which the court ruled
on was one for declaratory relief. Id. at 1082, n. 1.
23. The court also dealt with the question of when a PEIS should be prepared.
See discussion in text accompanying n. 62.
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overall EIS for the LMFBR program was required in addition to the individual project statements,24 and concluded
that "NEPA requires impact statements for major federal
research programs, such as the Commission's LMFBR program, aimed at development of new technologies which,
when applied, will significantly affect the quality of the
human environment". 5 The holding focused upon the irretrievable commitment of resources which the program would
entail and how such a commitment would encourage the
completion of individual segments of the program which
might not otherwise be completed.2 6
The United States Supreme Court also has considered a
case which illustrates how the typical PEIS issue arises.
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club 7 the Court was faced with a suit
which had been brought in the District Court in the District
of Columbia, but in which the fact situation involved the
Northern Great Plains area of the Far West. The Sierra
Club sued the Department of the Interior in an attempt to
require preparation of an EIS on the Department's program
for coal development in a region known as the Northern
Great Plains region. The Sierra Club felt that the Department's coal development policy for the area was of great
environmental importance since a large percentage of the
ownership rights to the region's enormous coal reserves
belong to the Federal Government. The Department had
prepared individual impact statements in connection with
its approval of each of four mining sites in one small portion
of the larger region. In addition to the individual impact
statements, the Department had prepared a nationwide EIS
evaluating its entire range of coal-related activities. The
Sierra Club, however, claimed that by issuing coal leases,
granting rights-of-way, and taking other actions to enable
the development of the area's coal by private companies, the
Department was involved in a major action affecting the
entire region. Therefore, the Sierra Club contended that
NEPA required the preparation of an EIS of regional scope.
24.
25.
26.
27.

SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1088.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1090.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15.
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The Court was faced with the problem of determining
whether an EIS in addition to those of national and project
scope was required to evaluate the regional impact of the
Department's coal program. In essence, the court had to
decide whether NEPA required the preparation of a statement for an area which had been partially evaluated in
the limited site specific EISs and evaluated in total in
the broad national coal EIS. Kleppe points up the difficulty
in determining what is the proper extent of a NEPA evaluation. The Court eventually ruled that no regional PEIS
was required and that the completed EISs fulfilled the
demands of NEPA.2"
The second important way in which consideration of a
programmatic EIS can arise is in effect the inverse of the
first situation. It involves situations in which an adequate
EIS has been prepared on an overall program and the
agency's failure to prepare a site specific EIS is challenged.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Energy Research and Development Administration,9 the court was
faced with this type of situation. Plaintiff challenged
ERDA's decision not to prepare individual EISs for nuclear
waste tanks which it was preparing to construct, stating
that the programmatic statements which had been prepared
on the entire waste storage program were insufficient to
satisfy NEPA. ERDA argued that "no site-specific EISs
were necessary because the environmental impacts of these
projects had been or were being analyzed in separate programmatic statements. . .. o

The court did not atempt to deal with the difficult issue
of deciding how large an area, or what portion of an agency
program, should properly be considered in a single EIS.
Rather, the court examined the programmatic statements
which ERDA had prepared to determine whether they had
28. The court reasoned that a regional development program had not been proposed by the Department and that a statement could be required when the
program had not been "proposed" by the agency involved. See discussion
of Kleppe v. Sierra Club decision at n. 72.
29. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Energy Research and Development Administration, 451 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
NRDC v. ERDA].

30. Id. at 1256.
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considered sufficiently all of the environmental impacts
associated with the construction of the individual storage
facilities. Finding that the overall statements did not contain adequate evaluations of the individual facilities, the
court ruled that ERDA was required to prepare "site specific" EISs for the construction of the new facilities. The
approach taken by the court, evaluating whether all impacts
are considered in some statement, whatever its form, is
arguably superior to the approach of trying to define a
program and then requiring an EIS of corresponding coverage found in the SIPI v. AEC, Kleppe, type cases. Attempts
to determine what is properly a project or program at the
expense of losing sight of whether all environmental impacts
are considered in one EIS or another fails to effectuate the
goals of NEPA.8 1
The development of the programmatic EIS has spawned
numerous attempts by commentators12 and courts to devise
a separate set of standards by which to evaluate such statements. A usable set of PEIS standards must focus primarily
upon two considerations. The first consideration is the
proper scope of a program EIS. The second is the proper
time for preparation of the PEIS. Scope refers to the extent
of agency activities which are properly considered within a
statement. For example, in Kleppe the issue of scope required
a determination of whether NEPA required a statement on
the regional level as well as those which had already been
prepared on the local and national levels. Scope is essentially
a question of what extent of an agency activity is properly
evaluated in an EIS. In considering proper scope, courts
often have concentrated on defining the size of the agency
action and then requiring a statement of the same extent
rather than ensuring that all environmental impacts are
considered. 4 This approach has weakened the effectiveness
of many of the court devised scope tests.
See discussion of conceptual problems involved in usual approach to PEIS
at text accompanying n. 86.
32. See Koshland supra note 6, Wegner supra note 7, DUKE Note supra note 4
and MICH. Note, supra note 8.
33. See SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)
and cases cited therein.
34. See discusion at text accompanying n. 29 considering the court's approach
in NRDC v. ERDA.
31.
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Courts have developed several approaches in attempting
to deal with the scope issue. The majority of courts have
applied variations of the independent utility test."5 The
source of this test is found in NEPA cases considering what
form of EIS was required for highway construction projects. 6
The concerns with which the highway cases attempted to
deal are evident in Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe.37 Indian
Lookout involved a situation in which the Iowa State Highway Department had developed a plan for construction of
approximately 2,000 miles of highway. This highway plan,
however, remained highly tentative. The highway department
requested federal funding for a seven-mile segment of the
plan which they were prepared to build. 8 Plaintive environmentalists contended that, if the project received federal
funding, the entire 2,000 mile construction plan required an
environmental impact statement. The lower court had concluded that an impact statement limited in scope to an
improved fourteen mile segment of the highway was proper.3 "
The appellate court was faced with the classic PEIS problem
of proper scope: "[W]hat is the minimum appropriate length
of a highway project to be environmentally considered under
[NEPA]...." 4 0 The court realized that allowing preparation
of an EIS limited to a relatively small segment of the highway construction would ignore the cumulative environmental
impact of the entire system and, furthermore, such small
segment planning would foreclose consideration of alternatives.4 Balancing these concerns was the realization that
requiring an EIS on the entire system would not only be
uneconomical, but would fail to provide useful facts on a
system which largely remained in the planning stage.42 The
court concluded that if a proposed segment of highway could
be said to have "independent utility", then an EIS limited
35. Wegner supra note 7, at 141.
36. See e.g., Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Swain v. Brinegar,

517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346
F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).

37. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
cited at Indian Lookout].
38. Id. at 13.
39. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
40. Indian Lookout, supra note 37, at 13.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 16.
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to that segment was appropriate."
Although the Indian Lookout court did develop at least
some form of a test to determine the proper extent of a
highway to be evaluated in an EIS, it failed to set a scope
standard useful to later courts and agencies considering
different types of agency action or even similar highway
situations. In addition, despite the court's recognition of
environmental planning problems, its "independent utility/
major termini" test is too rigid to allow for the complete
evaluation of environmental impacts in all situations.
Later EIS cases, searching for a meaningful standard,
followed the lead of the highway cases and applied independent utility reasoning in contexts other than highway construction. 4 The approach of the courts in these cases has
been to hold that the scope of the project EIS is adequate to
satisfy NEPA if the action has independent utility, and to
require a broad program EIS only where the individual
projects do not have such independence. 5 This independent
utility reasoning contains a logical error which reduces the
effectiveness of the EIS in agency planning and defeats the
purpose of NEPA. The fact that a project is sufficiently
independent of other actions to be evaluated in a separate
EIS has no bearing on whether the environmental impact of
the entire program, of which the independent action is but
a part, will be fully evaluated. This independent utility test
fails to consider that the total impact of a program may
exceed the sum of the impacts associated with the individual
projects making up the program. Failure to require a single
EIS covering all facets of a program may mean that these
cumulative impacts are never discussed, and the effectiveness of long range environmental planning is inhibited.4
43. The court implied that the test for independent utility would be a determination that the ends of the highway were at major termini. Id. at 19.
44. See e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (an EIS
need not be prepared to include both the initial construction of a dam and
the later disposal of half the created reservoir capacity) ; Sierra Club v.
Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) (programmatic EIS was not required
for the Central Utah Reclamation Project as long as an EIS was prepared

for each independent unit of the project).

45. Id.

46. See discussion of cumulative impact test at text accompanying n. 48 and
Wegner, supra note 7, at 147-58.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1

10

Barney: The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the National
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

1981

The test also fails to consider a project's implications
for shaping future decisions.4 ' Allowing a series of projects
to proceed on the basis of individual statements means that
completion of the first project will push the scales in favor
of completing each additional associated project, since certain
of the associated costs have already been incurred with the
development of the first project. Each additional project
may add only a small increase in harm to the environment,
but the total impact may be severe. In such situations, if the
entire project had been examined before allowing an individual project to proceed, the environmental costs may have
been sufficient to stop the program, or at least force a consideration of alternatives. The independent utility test fails
to consider the cumulative impact of an entire program or
the tendency of one completed project to tip the scales in
favor of further projects. But, probably more importantly,
it fails to provide a clear guide to agency planners of what
is proper EIS scope.
Some courts have realized that the cumulative impact
of several actions may be greater than the sum of the individual impacts and have required preparation of a program
EIS on that basis.4" The cumulative impact analysis is a
more sophisticated approach than the independent utility
test since it is based on a determination of what environmental impacts may occur.
The test incorporates the realization that the overall
environmental impact of a series of insignificant agency
actions may in sum be significant and thus justify preparation of a PEIS. The cumulative impact test does not attempt
to determine what is the proper extent of an agency action
to be considered in a statement. Rather the approach highlights a factor, overall impacts, which should be evaluated
as part of the scope determination. In this sense it is superior
to the independent utility test which concentrates on finding
a justifiable limit to statement scope rather than attempting
to ensure that all environment aspects are considered.
47. See discussion of environmental concerns text accompanying n. 60.
48. Cady v. Morton, 8upra note 14 and Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15.
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On the whole, the cumulative impact test is responsive
to environmental concerns.49 However, courts applying the
cumulative impact analysis can be criticized for failing to
indicate what that cumulative impact is and what relationship exists between the adequacy of the project EIS and the
need for a program statement.5"
Another judicial approach, which is often used in combination with cumulative impact reasoning, concentrates
upon the irretrievable commitment of resources which implementation of a particular action will involve. Such an
approach conforms to the requirements of NEPA5" and is
responsive to environmental considerations generally. 2
The leading case applying this approach is again SIPI
v. AEC." The court required the AEC to prepare an EIS
covering its entire LMFBR program 4 reasoning that the
massive funding and long-lead time required to develop new
energy technology would effectively foreclose alternative
energy sources which might be considered in the future. "
In effect, the court felt that the current commitment of
resources to the LMFBR program would make it impossible
to switch funding to alternative energy technology at some
later date since such an action would require the abandonment of the time and resources already expended on the
LMFBR program." "The manner in which we divide our
limited research and development dollars today among various
promising technologies in effect determines which technologies will be available, and what type and amount of environmental effects will have to be endured, in the future when
we must apply some new technology to meet the projected
energy demand."5 7
49. See discussion of environmental concerns at text accompanying n. 60.
50. In other words, there may be situations in which the sum of the environ-

mental impacts of a number of projects is properly considered if each project
is evaluated individually. To avoid duplication of the EIS process, courts

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

should explain what additional impact will occur from a series of projects
which is not considered in the individual project statements.
NEPA requires that agency EISs contain an evaluation of "any irreversible
and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (1976).
See discussion of environmental concerns at text accompanying n. 60.
See discussion at text accompanying n. 10 and 22.
Id.
SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1090.
See discussion in DUKE Note, supra note 4, at 634.
SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1090.
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The court feared that by allowing individual projects
to proceed without an evaluation of the entire LMFBR program, less environmentally harmful alternatives would be
dismissed as a result of the commitment already made. What
the court hoped to produce was a consideration of alternative
energy programs before massive investments of time and
money had been made in the LMFBR program and at a time
when other approaches to energy development were still
viable alternatives."
The SIPI v. AEC opinion pointed up the need to look
at a program with a broad enough perspective to understand all of its implications for environmental impact.
However, having pointed out that the failure to evaluate
agency actions on a broad enough scale could lead to foreclosure of alternatives, the court failed to develop a test
which would indicate when such a situation existed other
than a "I know it when I see it" type of reasoning. If we
consider the situation in Kleppe, the SIPI v. AEC reasoning
tells us that the Department of Interior's coal leasing program had to be evaluated at a level broad enough to ensure
that alternative approaches are considered before their implementation is effectively foreclosed. However, SIPI v. AEC
fails to provide a basis for determining what is the proper
scope for statements made in such evaluations. The SIPI v.
AEC reasoning applied to Kleppe could as easily lead to a
holding that a regional statement was required or, instead,
a state-wide statement, or perhaps a river basin statement.
Despite this weakness, the SIPI v. AEC opinion did point up
one more factor which should be considered in determining
the scope of a PEIS.
The numerous attempts to develop a standard approach
to the question of proper EIS scope is reflective of the
difficulty of the problem. To date, no single, consistently
useful, approach has been developed. Agencies are faced with
the problem of complying with inconsistent standards of
See
58. For other cases examining the foreclosure of alternatives analysis,
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Calloway, 382 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C.
1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974).
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scope and with little guidance as to which one ultimately
will be used to judge their NEPA compliance.
Any test of EIS scope should provide a clear guide to
agencies of what a statement should include. In addition,
the test should reflect the concerns of both those who prepare
statements and those anxious to protect the environment.
The agency position is comparable to that taken by any business or individual who is forced to comply with a difficult
and potentially costly set of government requirements which
eventually may lead to extensive litigation. Ever mindful of
projects which divert funding from their assigned missions,
agencies tend to view an EIS as an unnecessary expenditure
of funds. The broader the statement required, the greater
the cost.
An agency concern, equally as important as cost, is the
restriction upon agency action which the EIS requirements
impose. Federal agencies often function in incremental steps
with no overall plan. This is in direct conflict with the theory
behind proper preparation of the PEIS. Requiring agencies
to prepare broad evaluation statements forces them to
function in an unaccustomed manner and is generally
viewed, by the agencies, as inhibiting agency effectiveness
and efficiency.59
Presently, agencies are left in a position in which they
have no clear test of what constitutes proper scope for an
EIS and their natural tendency is to press for as restrictive
an interpretation of statement scope as is reasonably possible.
The predictable result is agency resistance to broad program
statement requirements.
These agency concerns and fears are matched by equally
prominent concerns on the part of environmentalists, some
of which are reflected in the court approaches discussed
59. For example, water development projects on the Colorado River should
arguably be evaluated on a programmatic scale by the agency primarily
responsible for them, perhaps the Corps of Engineers or the Department
of the Interior. However, such a requirement certainly would impede agency
progress in approving and guiding new dams and other river-use projects.
See discussion in Wegner, supra note 7, at 128.
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earlier. The environmental position can be summarized as
vehement opposition to overly narrow EISs which permit
agencies to function without adequately considering the
environmental impact of their decisions. When decisions are
made in a step-by-step manner, rather than by considering
the overall effects of the final outcome, less damaging alternatives are easily foreclosed. 0 Such short range planning
means that less environmentally harmful approaches are
not considered and also that any major alteration in approach
is made impracticable by the costs already sunk into the
program and which would be lost in any change in the
approach.
In addition to foreclosing less environmentally harmful
alternatives, statements which are too restricted in scope
ignore the cumulative impacts of a series of projects making
up a program.6 Narrow statements may show that the harm
associated with each segment of a program is reasonable.
However, the narrow statements may fail to indicate that
the overall impact, from all of the projects, will be unacceptable.
In addition to proper statement scope, the PEIS problem
involves the equally important question of proper timing.
In considering when a statement should be prepared, one
must remember that a statement is not an end in itself.
Rather, it is intended to aid in agency consideration of
environmental impacts associated with government actions.
To serve this function, a statment must be prepared at a
point in the agency planning process where it can illuminate potential environmental problems. A statement should
be used to help make agency decisions. It was not intended
to be used as post justification for decisions already made.
The timing question, which extends beyond the realm of the
programmatic statement question, comes down to the question
of when statements should be required in order that they
will be as helpful as possible to agency decision makers.
60. See discussion of irretrievable commitment of resources at text accompanying n. 51.
61. See discussion of cumulative impact tests at text accompanying n. 48.
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Once more, as in the case of proper statement scope, 2
the court in SIPI v. AEC provided an illuminating discussion
of the timing issue. Discussing the central concerns of the
timing issue, the court said ".

.

. we are pulled in two direc-

tions. Statements must be written late enough in the development process to contain meaningful information, but they
must be written early enough so that whatever information
is contained can practically serve as an input into the decision
making process." 6 The court then proceeded to develop a test
which balanced the considerations pressing for early preparation of a statement against those which would favor delayed
preparation. The court sought a formula which would provide
an EIS at that point in time when it would be most helpful
to agency decision-makers.
The court applied a four-factor balancing test to determine whether preparation of an EIS was timely. The factors
which the court considered were identified as the likelihood
that a program would actually be developed,64 the extent to
which information is currently available on the environmental effects of proceeding with the proposed program,6
the extent to which irretrievable commitments of resources
are being made, 6 and finally, the severity of the environmental impacts which would result if the action were implemented. After examining these factors, the court concluded that there was "no rational basis for deciding that
the time is not yet right for drafting an impact statement
on the overall LMFBR program. Consideration of each of
the facts set out in our balancing test point in the direction
of drafting an impact statement now."68
The court's test attempts to devise a flexible method of
determining when a statement should be prepared. However,
the resulting test is so flexible that it fails to provide any real
guidance. Each factor which is incorporated into the test is
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See discussion at text accompanying n. 53.
SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1094.
Id. at 1096.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
1d at 1095-96.
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one of degree. The court fails to reveal what degree must be
reached for each factor before a statement is required.
Furthermore, there is no explanation of the relationship
between the factors and whether or not a statement should
be begun on the basis of less than all of the factors.
The court of appeals applied this same balancing test
in the case of Sierra Club v. Morton. 9 In that case, the court
again ruled that the time was proper for preparation of a
programmatic EIS. However, the Kleppe case (renamed
Kleppe v. Sierra Club) was appealed to the Supreme Court
which pointedly rejected the lower court's determination of
proper statement timing by using the balancing test. "A
court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germination process of a potential
0
proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared.""
The Supreme Court's rejection of the SIPI v. AEC-type
balancing test probably was based upon a fear that such a
test would result in an excessive number of decisions
requiring preparation of EISs. The court was anxious to
avoid a test which would require the development of a statement, and the expenditure of funds necessary for the development of such a statement, in situations in which agency
action had not progressed sufficiently that it could be considered as likely to occur. In effect, the court was faced
with the same problem as the SIPI v. AEC court, but rejected
SIPI v. AEC's balancing approach and, instead, ruled that
the timing issue was to be decided upon a strict reading of
the statutory language in NEPA.7 '
Kleppe7" is the only Supreme Court opinion to provide
an in-depth consideration of the PEIS issue. Although the
Kleppe opinion is informative on certain aspects of the
programmatic question, overall it tends to confuse rather
69. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15, at 406.
71. See discussion of major policy pronouncements contained in Kleppe v.
Sierra Club at text accompanying n. 76.
72. See explanation of fact situation at text accompanying n.27.
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than to enlighten. Since this is the major pronouncement by
the highest court in the land on the programmatic question,
it is important to examine the holdings of the case prior to
an evaluation of the new CEQ regulations.
Most significantly, the Court clearly stated its approval
of the interpretation of NEPA which would require a broad,
programmatic EIS in certain situations. The court found that
a number of proposed actions could require an overall EIS
if the actions would have a "cumulative or synergistic environmental impact."7 To this extent, the Court agreed with
the plaintiff environmental organization bringing suit in
Kleppe. However, the Court did not agree that the individual
actions taken by the Department of Interior related to coal
development in the Northern Great Plains region were such
as to require a PEIS. The plaintiffs had contended that a
PEIS was required for all coal-related projects in the region
"because they [were] intimately related." 4 The Court ruled
instead that the determination of the proper scope of an EIS
was to be based upon agency consideration of relevant factors
such as "the interrelationship among proposed actions and
practical considerations of feasibility." 5 The Court concluded
that evaluation of these factors was a highly technical and
involved process and one which the involved agency was best
equipped to handle. Therefore, the Court felt that it was
proper to give a high degree of deference to an agency
determination of proper statement scope and ruled that a
regional EIS was not required.
The Kleppe opinion considered the question of timing
of a PEIS as well as the question of proper statement scope.
The Court concluded that the question of proper statement
timing could be resolved by a reading of the statutory
language in NEPA. Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires
an impact statement "in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ73. Id. at 410.
74. Id. at 408.
75. Id. at 412.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1

18

Barney: The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the National
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

1981

ment." 8 Basing its determination of the timing issue
squarely upon this statutory language, the Court ruled that
a PEIS is not required unless there is an agency proposal
for the action or group of actions in question." The Court
found that, in the Kleppe situation, local and national proposals had been developed and that these required impact
statements (which had been prepared). The Court, however,
found that no proposal existed for an action of regional scope
as the plaintiffs had contended."8 Therefore, an EIS of
regional scope was not required.
This strict statutory interpretation of the impact statement timing issue overruled the balancing approach to
timing which the court of appeals had taken. 9 The court of
appeals did not find that there was a regional program being
developed by the Department of Interior, rather the lower
court had concluded that there was a contemplated plan or
program. The lower court, proceeding upon the premise that
it was proper to require preparation of an impact statement
at some point prior to the formal report on a proposal,
applied its four-part balancing test and concluded that the
time was right for preparation of an impact statement if
the federal agency intended to continue its control of coal
development in the region. The Supreme Court flatly rejected
this approach. "The Court [circuit] reasoning and action
is required, and find no support in the language or legislative history of NEPA. The statute clearly states when an
impact statement is required and mentions nothing about
a balancing of factors."8 Relying upon an earlier NEPA
case,8 the Court determined that the statutory language of
NEPA required an EIS only when a proposal had been put
forth.
Although the Supreme Court invalidated the lower
court's balancing test approach, it appears likely that the
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1976).
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15, at 399.
Id. at 400.
Sierra Club v. Morton, supra note 69. The court of appeals had applied the
same balancing test to determine whether the time was right for a PElS
as it had applied in SIPI v. AEC. See discussion at text accompanying n. 63.
80. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15, at 405.

76.
77.
78.
79.

81. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975).
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Court disagreed more with the result of the balancing test
than its actual application. Both courts were concerned with
developing a method of timing which would ensure that
statements were prepared early enough to adequately evaluate environmental impacts, but yet not require statements
for ideas which would never develop beyond the discussion
stage. The court of appeals approached this problem with its
balancing test. The Supreme Court found its solution in the
proposal language of the NEPA statute. Theoretically, requiring an EIS at the time of an agency proposal is reasonable. However, the court in Kleppe seems to have overlooked
the fact that no uniform definition of proposal exists."2 The
Court's failure to define proposal, or to allow courts to make
their own assessment of when an EIS should be prepared,
in large part leaves courts in the position of having to accept
agency determinations of what is a proposal (and so requires
an EIS) and what is only contemplated.
A third important aspect of the Kleppe decision involves
the Court's opinion that projects, which have individual
EISs, may proceed under certain circumstances even though
a PEIS has not been prepared for the entire program of
which the projects are a part.s" The court noted that individual projects with proper EISs should be allowed to proceed even though a broader statement covering several
projects had not been prepared, unless individual statements
inadequately analyzed the environmental impacts of, or
alternatives to, the specific projects. If it was later determined that a broad program statement should be prepared,
then that statement would take into consideration environmental effects of the projects which already had been
initiated.84
Although there may be situations in which projects
may proceed without harm before the overall program EIS
82. Consider that the court was able to state "that the mere 'contemplation' of
certain action is not sufficient to require an impact statement. . .

.",

Kleppe

v. Sierra Club, supra note 15, at 404, and then base its determination of
whether a statement was required upon the existence of a proposal. Without
the court providing some sort of explanation, it is difficult to see the
distinction between a contemplated action and a proposal.
83. Id. at 407 n. 16 and at 414 n. 26.
84. 1&.
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is completed, the Kleppe Court failed to adequately state the
considerations involved in defining such projects. The Court's
opinion does note that when the program statement is prepared it should incorporate a consideration of the cumulative
environmental effect of the existing projects, as well as the
proposed projects.85 While this reasoning touches upon the
cumulative impact aspect of proper EIS preparation, it fails
to consider the problem of incremental decision making. In
a situation in which some projects are allowed to proceed
before an overall evaluation of the program is made, the
limited environmental costs of each project may be so insignificant as to have little or no effect upon the methods
selected to implement the program. However, were the
environmental costs of the entire program evaluated prior
to the initiation of the individual projects, those costs could
prove sufficient to halt the program or alter it. Considerations such as these may have been intended by the Court
when it spoke in terms of statements considering the cumulative impact of proposals. However, this is not made clear.
The treatment of the scope and timing issues in the
context of the programmatic EIS reveals a failure to develop
useful approaches to these difficult problems. It appears
that in large part the difficulty derives from the continuing
attempt to develop standard, methodical approaches which
are applicable to every situation when, in fact, the scope and
timing concerns require a case-by-case consideration of what
approach will best serve the aims of NEPA. Courts have
attempted to define the scope of a program and then require
an EIS of corresponding coverage rather than ensuring that
all impacts are evaluated somewhere. In fact, there is no
systematic test for determining whether a set of agency
actions are properly a program or merely individual projects.
Furthermore, if a program exists, there is no exacting way
of determining just which agency actions should be included
as part of that program. This is the problem which the Court
in Kleppe faced. It was presented with the situation in which
there were no obvious bounds for the scope of the EIS
86.ICL
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analysis."0 The Kleppe Court faced this problem by concluding
that the extent of a program, and therefore the extent of the
EIS, was what the agency said it was.
In much the same way that courts have failed to deal
adequately with the question of proper PEIS scope, they have
failed to provide a workable standard of when such a statement should be required. The Kleppe Court attempted to
resolve the problem by once more giving deference to
agency determination of proper timing. Here again, the
court seems determined to find a concrete standard which
will be applicable to every situation and hit upon the
statutory proposal language of NEPA as an answer. As
noted earlier, this presents the problem of defining a proposal which Kleppe implies should be left to the agency. The
courts have failed to provide agencies with useful standards
for determining the proper scope and timing of broad environmental impact statements. They have become bogged
down in attempts to develop hard and fast rules which are
applicable to every situation. In doing so, they have often
neglected to ensure that NEPA's goal of including environmental factors in agency decision processes is met and thus
the goal of protecting the environment to the fullest extent
possible is slighted. The new Council on Environmental
Quality Regulations are faced with the difficult task of
providing rules definite enough to give agencies guidance in
preparing EISs while at the same time remaining flexible
enough to ensure adequate protection of the environment in
the myriad of activities in which the federal government is
involved.
The CEQ's new NEPA Regulations became effective on
July 30, 1979. These regulations, which require mandatory
compliance by federal agencies, replace the Council's NEPA
Guidelines which had been in effect prior to July 30th. In
addition to being binding upon agency decision-makers, the
new Regulations address all nine sub-divisions of Section
102 (2) of NEPA rather than just the EIS provision covered
by the old Guidelines. President Carter directed the Council
86. Id. at 402 n. 14.
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to develop these new regulations in Executive Order 11991
issued on May 24, 1977.87 The President requested that the
regulations be ". . . designed to make the environmental
impact statement process more useful to decisionmakers and
the public; and to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of
extraneous background data, in order to emphasize the need
to focus on real environmental issues and alternatives. 88
The new regulations8 9 represent an extensive revision
of the old guidelines. Despite this extensive revision, and the
long-raging debate over the programmatic EIS issue, the
regulations make no attempt to deal with the programmatic
issue separately or outside of the requirements for an
adequate EIS of any scope. This approach seems well thought
out and helpful. It represents the realization that, for the
purposes of a NEPA EIS, agency programs can be dealt
with in the same manner as individual projects. It is unnecessary to develop a separate set of rules governing programmatic statements. This approach underscores the fact that
it is not particularly important in what form environmental
impacts are evaluated, as long as they are properly evaluated. 0°
Having concluded that the agency action in question
is federal,"' and significantly affects 3 the quality of the
environment, 4 and therefore requires an EIS, we can then
consider how the new regulations deal with the questions of
proper statement scope and timing.
The CEQ has sought to ensure that agency statements
will be prepared at a time which will ensure that they become
an integral part of the agency decision making process. The
statement should aid in the making of agency decisions
rather than being used as a mechanism for post-decision
justification. 5 The CEQ's approach to proper statement
87. Exec. Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (1977).
88. Id. Sec. 3(h).
89. All citations to the new regulations are to the relevant section reprinted in
40 C.F.R. (1980).
90. See SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1092.
91. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1980).
92. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1980).
93. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3 and § 1508.8 (1980).
94. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1980).
95. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g) (1980).
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timing is based upon the Kleppe decision. A reading of that
opinion leaves one with the impression that an agency need
not consider preparing an EIS until such time as it has
formally proposed an action. In effect, this seems to mean
that an agency is given a free hand to make its planning
decisions and then justify these decisions, in violation of the
goals of NEPA, with an EIS. The regulations begin with the
Supreme Court determination that an agency need not have
a final statement ready until such time as it proposes an
action96 and modifies the Court's apparently restrictive interpretation of EIS timing by defining proposal and by adding
the concept of a preliminary or draft EIS.
A proposal exists at that point in time when an agency
"has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision
on one or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal
and the effects can be meaningfully evaluated."97 This definition embodies the dual considerations involved in any
determination of proper statement planning. First, it states
that a proposal exists at that point when decisions are being
made, in essence at a point in time early enough that preparation of an EIS could play an integral part in the decision
process. Secondly, the definition requires that the effects of
an agency action can be meaningfully evaluated before a
proposal can be said to exist. It is also important to note that
the definition goes on to state that a proposal "may exist
in fact as well as by agency declaration. . ..

"I

This means

that courts may rule that the time is right for the preparation of a statement in situations in which agencies have not
declared a proposed action. This is despite language in Kleppe
which could be read as giving agencies the sole power to
determine when a proposal does, in fact, exist.
After defining a proposal as existing at the time an
agency is preparing to make a decision, the regulations tie
in the EIS requirement by requiring a two-step statement
procedure. The CEQ requires that the EIS process be timed
so that a final statement will be completed in time for
96. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra note 15, at 406.
97. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1980).
98. 1d.
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inclusion in any report or recommendation upon a proposed
agency action. 9 The CEQ then ensures that agencies will
consider environmental concerns prior to the report stage by
requiring preparation of a draft EIS as a preliminary step
in the development of the final statement."0 The Regulations
require that there be at least forty-five days allowed for
comment on the draft statements before issuance of the
final environmental impact statement. 1 ' Furthermore, the
Regulations state that the entire impact statement preparation process shall commence as close as possible to the time
an agency is developing or is presented with a proposal."'
In effect, the regulations ensure that the environment will
be considered during the decision-making process, not by
changing the point at which the final EIS is required, but
by requiring an elongated process leading up to the completion of any EIS.
By requiring an agency to develop a final EIS only
through a rather lengthy process and requiring that the
process, and thus the final EIS, be completed in time for
inclusion in any report on a proposal for agency action, the
regulations have ensured the consideration of the environment during the decision-making process. Since the regulations make no timing demand upon the final EIS, other
than that it be complete at the time of a report of recommendation on an agency proposal, they do not conflict with the
Kleppe opinion. The Council has merely developed an extensive statement process necessary for the preparation of
a final EIS and thus required agencies to begin work on the
statement before the final report stage is reached. 0 s
Not only do the new regulations not violate the timing
determination which the Kleppe court reached, but it appears
that they incorporate the considerations which led the
Kleppe court to make such a restrictive reading of NEPA.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

This coincides with the Kleppe v. Sierra Club holding on the timing issue.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (1980) for the requirements of the draft EIS.
40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1980).
40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1980).
See dissenting opinion in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 8uptra note 15, at 415, expressing the opinion that a statement is useful only if it is prepared prior
to the report stage.
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The probable motivation for the court interpretation was a
fear that statements would be required at too early a point
in the agency decision process. The two-stage definition of
a proposal which is set out in the regulations"' clearly was
intended to require that statements be prepared only for those
agency actions which are likely to develop to fruition.0 5
The new regulations approach the issue of proper statement scope with the presumption that no distinction need
be made between programs and individual projects. Therefore, the regulations provide only one set of rules governing
statement scope. These rules are aimed at requiring the
consideration of all important environmental impacts at some
point, rather than at determining that certain types of
impacts should be considered in either broader or narrower
statements.
The regulations emphasize that EISs are required for
broad agency actions impacting upon the environment, as
well as more narrowly defined actions. The regulations
specifically state that impact statements may be required
for broad agency actions or new programs.' ° The Council
concludes that federal actions which are the potential basis
of an EIS tend to fall into one of four categories. 07 These
categories include (1) adoption of official policy such as
rules or regulations, (2) adoption of formal plans which
prescribe alternative uses of federal resources and which
will guide future agency actions, (3) adoption of programs
such as a group of actions to implement a specific policy,
and (4) approval of specific projects."0 8 These categories
make it clear that agency actions of broader scope than
specific projects may require an EIS. 09
104. 1) the agency has a goal it is attempting to reach and 2) the effects of
alternative means of accomplishing that goal can be meaningfully evaluated.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1980).
105. See 43 FED. REG. 55989 § 1508.23, comment 2, expressing the Council's intent that the regulations not be read to mean that a proposal exists at a
point too early in the planning process to make adequate evaluation possible.
106. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (1980).
107. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (1980).
108. Id.
109. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (1980) generally.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1

26

1981

Barney: The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the National
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

The regulations require that the subject of each EIS
be properly defined in that "[p]roposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be,
in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a
single impact statement."'10 To assist in meeting this requirement, the Council has included a section which explains the
considerations which should play a role in the proper determination of what to include in a single statement. 1 ' The
section explains that the agency's determination of proper
statement scope should be based upon an analysis of three
types of "actions", three types of "alternatives", and three
types of "impacts" which may be involved in an agency
action.
From the standpoint of the programmatic problem, the
discussion of the three types of actions which should be
considered in setting statement scope is most useful. The first
type of action, connected actions, includes actions which
(1) automatically trigger other actions, (2) cannot proceed
unless other actions are taken, and (3) are inter-dependent
parts of a larger action. The description of connected actions
shows the broad application to agency programs and related
actions which the CEQ intends the EIS requirement to have.
The second type of action which agencies should consider, and probably the most important from the perspective
of the PEIS situation, are cumulative actions. This section
includes actions which, when viewed with other proposed
actions, have cumulatively significant impacts. The Council
states that such cumulative impacts can result from the
"incremental impact of the actions when added to other past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future action ... .
The regulations also make clear that cumulative impacts
requiring evaluation can result "from individually minor but
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time.""' By making clear that the overall or cumulative
impact of several agency actions can be sufficient to justify
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1980).
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1980).
Id.
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an EIS, the regulations deal with one of the more frequently
overlooked concerns which a complete statement should
speak to.
The final form of actions are those which have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their environmental
consequences together. Examples of such similarities are
common timing or geography.
A determination that agency actions are either "connected" or "cumulative," as judged by the stated criteria,
requires that such actions be evaluated in one statement.
A finding that agency actions are similar does not require
evaluation in one statement but such a unitary evaluation
is encouraged if it appears to be the best way to assess
potential environmental impacts.
The regulations also attempt to avoid the foreclosure
of less environmentally harmful alternatives by the commitment of resources to activities whose environmental implications have not been fully considered. Agencies are specifically directed not to "commit resources prejudicing selection
of alternatives" before making a decision which takes into
account the possible environmental impacts, on the preferable
means of achieving its goal.' 14 More specifically, the regulations speak to the technological development situations such
as were involved in SIPI v. AEC. Statements on such actions
must be prepared and be available "before the program has
reached a stage of investment or commitment to implementasubsequent development or restrict
tion likely to determine
115
later alternatives.1

The Regulations make clear that the contents of any
individual statement may depend upon its relationship to
other statements and the contents of those statements. The
Council encourages preparation of statements of varying
coverage on the same subject. This approach, known as
tiering,"" means that broad actions such as programs or
114. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.2(f) and 1506.1(a)
115. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c)(3) (1980).
116. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1980).

(1980).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1

28

Barney: The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and the National
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

1981

policy decisions could be considered in statements of broad
scope, while narrower statements analyzing specific components of the broad agency action subsequently would be
prepared. Tiering is representative of the flexible attitude
to scope which the new regulations take. The emphasis is not
upon determining what matters should be evaluated in what
type of statement, but rather upQn ensuring that all impacts
are evaluated somewhere. 17 This flexible approach echoes
the sentiments of the SIPI v. AEC court: "So long as the...
NEPA cnalysis of the overall program is prepared, we think
it of little moment whether that analysis is issued as a
within
separate NEPA statement or whether it is included
18
facility."'
particular
a
a NEPA statement on
The regulations consider the problem which often arises
in PEIS disputes of whether individual actions may proceed
19
before the completion of a necessary program statement.
The CEQ has determined that projects may proceed prior to
the completion of the program statement in certain circumstances. To proceed, the project in question must be justified
independently of the program, have been evaluated by an
adequate EIS and, most importantly, must not prejudice the
ultimate decision on the program. 120 These requirements
greatly limit the projects within a program which can proceed prior to a PEIS and make it clear that such projects
will be allowed only when they do not involve the risk of
creating unevaluated environmental impacts.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the new regulations are an advance in dealing
with the programmatic statement question. They have noted,
and in some cases made extensive comments on, the important
considerations in broad impact statements. The CEQ has
devised a timing process which requires preparation of the
which
117. Note. however, that the regulations attempt to ensure that the actions discusare best evaluated together are analyzed in a single statement. See
sion at text accompanying n. 112 concerning what agencies to include in a
single statement.
118. SIPI v. AEC, supra note 10, at 1092.
119. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(c) (1980).
120. An action "pre'udices the ultimate decision on the program when it tends
to determine subsequent development or limit alternatives". Id.
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EIS prior to a formal agency proposal and thus helps to
integrate environmental considerations into the decision process. The regulations make clear that cumulative environmental impacts, or the chance that alternative approaches
will be foreclosed, as well as broad agency activities in
themselves, may trigger the EIS requirement. Most importantly, the new regulations provide a stronger framework
for guiding agency determinations of what should be included in an EIS.
The Council's regulations may be criticized, from the
programmatic statement standpoint, for failing to specifically deal with the classic programmatic problems. However, the regulations incorporate the typical PEIS concerns
into the rules applicable to all statements. The result is a
more concise set of regulations which avoid any gaps in
coverage which might result from separate rules. The regulations concentrate on ensuring that all environmental impacts
are properly evaluated without distinguishing projects from
programs. The PEIS problem is not dealt with explicitly,
but the concerns which have been associated with broad
agency actions are dealt with in a manner applicable to
agency actions of any size.
Admittedly, the new regulations may not solve all
programmatic problems. The CEQ has attempted to develop
a new groundwork which will guide agencies in approaching
the PEIS problem. Without contradicting the "proposal"
language of Kleppe, the regulations require a timing of the
statement process which incorporates the EIS into the agency
decision process. The new regulations are not concerned with
the size of an agency action, but rather concentrate upon
ensuring that all significant impacts upon the environment
be evaluated at some point. Of course, agencies are still left
to decide if cumulative impacts exist or if alternatives are
foreclosed. But, short of allowing the CEQ to prepare statements for each agency, it is impossible to eliminate all
agency discretion in proper statement preparation. Given
agency expertise within their own areas, it is efficient to
devel6p a framework that points out traditionally overlooked
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/1
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environmental concerns and then allow the agencies to act
upon these concerns themselves.
The new regulations provide helpful guidance to agencies facing the concerns involved in a broad EIS. By pointing
out the need for consideration of environmental impacts on
a broad scale, the regulations have done much to eliminate
the traditional programmatic impact statement problems.
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